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Abstract
We study the Footloose Entrepreneur model with a finite number of equidistant
regions, focusing on the analysis of stability of three types of long-run equilibria:
agglomeration, dispersion and partial dispersion. We find that, as the number of
regions increases, there is more tendency for agglomeration and less tendency for
dispersion. In the limit, as the number of regions tends to infinity, agglomeration
becomes the unique stable equilibrium. Our conclusions are robust to any depend-
ence of the total number of entrepreneurs and unskilled workers on the number of
regions. Numerical evidence suggests that industry cannot disperse evenly among
two regions when other regions have no industry. Finally, we introduce region het-
erogeneity in unskilled labour and obtain a more general condition for stability of
agglomeration. We then study the impacts of regional asymmetries and find that
having more unskilled workers in the core (or less in the periphery) increases the
tendency for agglomeration.
Keywords: Core-Periphery, Footloose Entrepreneur, Finite number of regions, Agglom-
eration
JEL Classification Numbers: R10, R12, R23.
1 Introduction
The secular tendency for spatial agglomeration of economic activity is well known and has
always been a matter of profound debate. Recent developments have allowed a more rig-
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orous treatment of such phenomena, with recourse to microeconomic foundations.1 The
benchmark in this literature is the Core-Periphery (CP) model, introduced by Krugman
(1991). However, several issues have been raised in recent literature about possible short-
comings due to some simplifying assumptions. One of these shortcomings is the prevalent
focus on the 2-region framework.
Theoretical insights on a model with three or more regions are interesting for different
reasons. One reason is the understanding of interdependencies among many regions to
guide empirical studies. A two-region set-up overlooks the variability of market access
across regions (Fujita and Thisse, 2009), thus more complex impacts may arise in a
multi-regional set-up compared to a two-region one (Fujita and Mori, 2005; Fujita and
Thisse, 2009; Behrens and Robert-Nicoud, 2011). As pointed out by Fujita et al. (1999),
the consideration of only two regions stems from the advantage of dealing with more
tractable problems, although it seems implausible that the geographical dimension of
economic activity can be reduced to a 2-region framework. It is important, therefore, to
understand to what extent the main conclusions obtained using 2-region models extend
to models with more regions.
This motivated a number of different studies. Castro et al. (2012) studied a 3-region
version of the CP model by Krugman (1991), and also a version with 2n regions equally
spaced around a circle. Comparing the behaviour of the 3-region model relatively to the
2-region model, their main conclusion was that the additional region favours the agglom-
eration of economic activity and hinders the dispersion of economic activity. Akamatsu et
al. (2012) sought to explain spatial agglomeration in a CP model with 2n regions. They
studied particular agglomeration patterns in the CP model as transportation costs stead-
ily decrease over time, where the number of regions in which firms locate is reduced by
half and the spacing between each pair of adjacent “core” regions doubles after each bi-
furcation. Oyama (2009) incorporated self-fulfilling expectations in migration decisions in
a multi-regional variant of the CP model and studied global stability in just one core re-
gion in the presence of asymmetries or trade barriers. Tabuchi and Thisse (2011) studied
the rise of a hierarchical system of central places in a multi-location space. Barbero and
Zofío (2016) considered different network topologies in order to study how the interplay
between centripetal and centrifugal forces change according to the heterogeneity of loc-
ation space. They showed that more heterogeneous configurations enforce the likelihood
of agglomeration in regions with higher centrality; i.e., those that are relatively better
located. The role of heterogeneous distances between regions has also been addressed
in other frameworks such as the racetrack economy (Krugman, 1993; Fujita et al., 1999;
1See Fujita et al. (1999), Ottaviano et al. (2002), Baldwin et al. (2003), Robert-Nicoud (2005) and the
references therein.
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Picard and Tabuchi; 2010; Mossay, 2013), equally spaced regions on the line segment (e.g.
Ago et al., 2006) or hexagonal distributions as in Ikeda et al. (2014). Tabuchi (2014), de-
veloped a multi-regional model based on Fujita et al. (1999) with exogenous asymmetries
both in trade costs and in the distribution of the immobile workers and found that it is
able to predict the historical tendency for agglomeration in the capital regions. The paper
focused on extreme values of transportation costs (autarky and almost-free trade). Other
recent contributions include Behrens et al. (2006), Akamatsu and Takayama (2009), Ikeda
et al. (2012), Forslid and Okubo (2012), Commendatore et al. (2015a), Fabinger (2015).2
Some of the inherent technical difficulties that stem from the extension of a 2-region
model to a multi-regional framework call for a base model that is more tractable than the
original CP model (Krugman, 1991). An analytically solvable version of the CP model,
dubbed the Footloose Entrepreneur (FE) model, was developed by Forslid and Ottaviano
(2003). The only difference with respect to the original CP model is that, in the FE model,
the variable input in the mobile sector is immobile labour instead of mobile labour. The
role of mobile (footloose) labour becomes limited to the fixed input (entrepreneurship)
in the mobile sector. This subtle modification renders the model analytically solvable
because the marginal production cost becomes independent of the spatial distribution of
economic activity.
This motivates us to consider an n-region version of the analytically solvable FE model
as it allows us to obtain a closed-form solution for the regional utility level as a function
of the spatial distribution of economic activity.3 Our set-up, by considering equidistant
regions, allows us to characterize analytically the stability of equilibria. Equidistance
among regions has been assumed in other works such as Tabuchi et al. (2005), Zeng and
Uchikawa (2014) and Gaspar et al. (2017). The focus of Tabuchi et al. (2005) is on how the
relationship between transport costs and congestion costs shapes the size of cities, which
tend to increase in early stages and then shrink at later stages.4 Zeng and Uchikawa
(2014) study spatial inequalities in a multi-region economy where each region differs in
size and there is only one single good produced under monopolistic competition. In their
setting, production is not footloose as the single input (capital) enters both in the fixed
cost and in the variable cost of the firm. Gaspar et al. (2017) used a FE model but with
a quasi-linear translog upper tier utility, as in Pflüger (2004), instead of the standard
2For a comprehensive and insightful overview of some of the main contributions concerning multire-
gional NEG models, see Commendatore et al. (2015b).
3Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Pflüger (2004) have also built analytically solvable CP models by con-
sidering quasi-linear preferences. These models are also potentially good candidates for extensions to
multiple regions. In fact, the model of Pflüger (2004) was extended to the case of n equidistant regions
by Gaspar et al. (2017).
4Additionally, their setup differs from ours in the sense that a quasi-linear utility is assumed, as in
Ottaviano et al. (2002).
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Cobb-Douglas form considered by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003).
Our main finding is that, as the number of regions increases, agglomeration becomes
more likely while dispersion becomes less likely. More precisely, we conclude that: (i)
the set of parameter values for which agglomeration is stable in an economy with n
regions is contained in the set of parameters for which it is stable in an economy with
n + 1 regions; and (ii) the set of parameter values for which dispersion is stable in an
economy with n + 1 regions is contained in the set of parameters for which it is stable
in an economy with n regions. This happens because, when unskilled workers are evenly
distributed among regions, more regions implies less immobile consumers in each region
and, therefore, lower local demand. As a result, a large region becomes relatively more
attractive as the market-size effect becomes stronger relative to the market-crowding
effect, which induces agglomeration.
We also consider a configuration of partial dispersion (i.e., symmetric dispersion across
m regions, with m < n). Numerical simulations for m = 2 and n = 3 suggest that
this configuration is always unstable, independently of parameter values. In addition,
our simulations indicate that multiplicity of equilibria and locational hysteresis are a
persistent feature of the FE model with an arbitrary number of regions, but disappears as
n tends to infinity because agglomeration becomes the only possible stable equilibrium.
As in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), we introduce exogenous regional asymmetries
in our n-region version of the FE model by considering regional heterogeneity in the
endowment of unskilled labour across regions. By studying the stability conditions for
agglomeration, we find that an increase of unskilled labour in the core region (or a decrease
of unskilled labour in the peripheral regions) strengthens the tendency for agglomeration.
This is achieved through an analysis of skilled labour wages providing further insight into
the agglomeration mechanism for a finite number of regions.
We conclude that the impact of considering additional regions in the FE model is
analogous to that of considering additional regions in the CP model. In this sense, the
FE model behaves similarly to the CP model (as desired by its creators).
Our analysis focused on local stability of equilibria considering an arbitrary number of
equidistant regions. It would be interesting to understand the interplay between variation
in the number of regions and other factors shaping the space economy, such as the role
of different spatial topologies studied by Barbero and Zofío (2016). This is left for future
work.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we obtain the
general expressions for nominal and real wages as functions of the spatial distribution
of the entrepreneurs. In Section 3, we address the dynamics of the model and find the
stability conditions for three possible kinds of equilibria: agglomeration, total dispersion
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and partial dispersion. We also discuss how each of these outcomes becomes more or
less likely as the parameters of the model change. In Section 4, we assess the effect of
increasing the number of regions on the behaviour of the FE model. In Section 5, we allow
for exogenous heterogeneity in the unskilled immobile labour factor in the FE model and
determine a more general local stability condition for agglomeration in order to study
how the spatial distribution of farmers is likely to influence the agglomerative outcome.
In Section 6, we make some concluding remarks.
2 Economic environment and short-run equilibrium
The economy is composed by n ≥ 2 regions that are assumed to be structurally identical
and equidistant from each other. The framework is that of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003),
except for the fact that an arbitrary number of regions is considered instead of only two.
The total endowments of entrepreneurs and unskilled labour are, respectively, H(n) and
L(n).5 Entrepreneurs can move among regions: ∑ni=1Hi = H(n); while unskilled workers
are immobile and assumed be evenly spread across the n regions: Li = L(n)n ,∀i.
The representative consumer of region i has utility:
Ui = Xµi A
1−µ
i , (1)











where di(s) is the consumption of variety s of manufactures in region i, N is the mass of
existing varieties, and σ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between different
varieties of manufactures, and µ ∈ (0, 1) is the share of expenditure in manufactured
goods.
Production requires, as inputs, α units of skilled labour (entrepreneurs) and β units
of unskilled labour for each unit that is produced. The production cost of a firm in region
i is:
Ci(xi) = wiα + wLi βxi, (3)
where wi is the nominal wage of skilled workers in region i and wLi is the nominal wage
of unskilled workers in region i.
Trade of manufactures between two regions is subject to iceberg costs τ ∈ (1,+∞).
5The dependence of these endowments on the number of regions increases the generality of the com-
parison between models with different numbers of regions.
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Let τij denote the number of units that must be shipped at region i for each unit that is
delivered at region j. Since the regions are assumed to be equidistant from each other,
we have the following trade cost structure:
τij = 1, if j = iτij = τ, if j 6= i.
The agricultural good is produced one for one using unskilled labour (under constant
returns to scale) and is freely traded across regions. Let pji(s) and dji(s) denote the price
and demand in region i of a variety, s, that is produced in region j. Utility maximization
















and Yi is the regional income:




Turning to the supply side and starting with the agricultural sector, absence of transport
costs implies that its price is the same everywhere (pA1 = ... = pAn ). Furthermore, under
perfect competition, we have marginal cost pricing: pAi = wLi , ∀i. Consequently, there is
unskilled workers’ wage equalization across regions: wL1 = ... = wLn . Hence, by choosing
the agricultural good as numeraire, we can set pAi = wLi = 1, ∀i. We assume that the
non-full-specialization (NFS) condition (Baldwin et al., 2003) holds, guaranteeing that
agriculture is active in all regions even if all manufacturing activity takes place in a single
region.6
Given the fixed cost in (3), the number of varieties manufactured in region i is vi =
6The NFS condition requires world expenditure on agricultural goods to be greater than the total




n L(n). This becomes
(1 − µ)[
∑
i wiHi + L(n)] ≥
n−1


















The optimal price of firm i is the same as in the 2-region model:
pij(s) = τijβ
σ
σ − 1 . (8)
All varieties produced in region i are sold at the same price and are equally demanded in













where φij ≡ τ 1−σij ∈ (0, 1) represents the “freeness of trade” between regions i and j.
Absence of entry barriers in the manufacturing industry translates into zero profits in








which becomes, considering the prices in (8):
wi =
βxi
α(σ − 1) , (10)
where xi ≡
∑n
j=1 τijdij is the total production by a manufacturing firm in region i. Using
























The spatial distribution of entrepreneurs can be described, in relative terms, by the vector
h ≡ (h1, ..., hn), where hi ≡ HiH(n) , ∀i. The fraction of entrepreneurs in region n may be
omitted because it is implicit in the other fractions: hn = 1 −
∑n−1
i=1 hi. The price index































For illustrative purposes, we present the closed-form solution for the equilibrium nominal






























































Since agents spend a fraction µ of their income on manufactures, whose price index is
Pi, and the price of agricultural goods is unity, the real wage or indirect utility level of
entrepreneurs is given by:
ωi = wi/P µi . (17)
3 Long-run equilibria and stability
Entrepreneurs tend to migrate to the region that offers them the highest real wage or
indirect utility (17). For concreteness, we consider replicator dynamics: the flow of entre-
preneurs to a region is proportional to the difference between the region’s real wage and
the weighted average real wage and to the number of entrepreneurs in the region.
Formally, the dynamics are described by the following system of n− 1 ordinary differ-
7See Appendix A for details on its calculation.
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ential equations defined in the simplex ∆ ≡
{
h ∈ Rn+ :
∑n




ḣ1 = (ω1 − ω̄)h1
...
ḣn−1 = (ωn−1 − ω̄)hn−1
, hi ∈ [0, 1] , ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}, (18)
where ω̄ ≡ ∑ni=1 hiωi is the weighted average real wage. Migration to the omitted region
in (18) is, consistently, given by ḣn = −
∑n−1
i=1 ḣi = (ωn − ω̄)hn.
In this dynamical system, migration to empty regions has to be started exogenously.
If a region is empty, hi = 0, then the corresponding differential equation for the dynamics
yields ḣi = 0, which means that the region remains empty. Hence, the boundary of the
simplex is invariant for the dynamics.
Direct substitution in equations (18) shows that the configurations:
h ∈
{













, 0, ..., 0
)}
and their permutations are equilibria. The equilibria represented by (1, 0, ..., 0) and its
permutations correspond to full agglomeration of industry in one region. This outcome
is called agglomeration or concentration. The second configuration describes an even
distribution of industry among the n regions. This outcome is called total dispersion.
The last configuration represents an even distribution of industry among only m of the
n regions (with m < n), while the remaining regions are deprived of industry. This is
what we call partial dispersion. The expression “partial dispersion” reflects that not all
regions have industry (partial) and that there are entrepreneurs in more than one region
(dispersion). Stability of each equilibrium is preserved by permutation so that the same
stability conditions hold for agglomeration or partial dispersion in any of the regions.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is said to be stable if, after any small exogenous migration
of skilled workers across regions, the spatial distribution of skilled workers is pulled back
to the initial one.
3.1 Stability of total dispersion
Since total dispersion is an interior configuration, its stability is given by the sign of the








This matrix has a repeated real eigenvalue with multiplicity n− 1, which is given by
8Note that, even though the spatial distribution of entrepreneurs can be described using n − 1 co-




















where P ui is the regional price index. This means that the stability of dispersion can be
described in terms of semi-elasticities. Entrepreneurs remain equally dispersed across the
n regions if a migration of entrepreneurs to a region induces a percentage change in the
nominal wage smaller than the corresponding percentage change in prices. In this case,
the loss in purchasing power due to an increase of the share of entrepreneurs, hi, leads
to an exodus from that region until the initial share of entrepreneurs is restored, that is,
until hi = 1n .
Proposition 1. Total dispersion is stable if:9
BP (φ) ≡ µ(2σ − 1) [(n− 1)φ+ 1]− µ2(1− φ)− (σ − 1)σ(1− φ) < 0. (20)
Proof. This is a sufficient condition for the eigenvalue in (19) to be negative. See Appendix
B.
To rule out the possibility that BP (φ) > 0, ∀φ ∈ (0, 1), which would preclude stability of
total dispersion, we assume:
σ > µ+ 1, (21)
commonly referred to as the no black-hole condition.10 Notice that BP (φ) is a linear
function of φ with positive coefficient. Equating BP (φ) to zero and solving for φ gives:
φb ≡
(σ − µ)(σ − 1− µ)
(σ − µ)(σ − 1− µ) + nµ(2σ − 1) < 1, (22)
which is the threshold level for φ below which (20) holds and thus total dispersion is
stable. Lower transportation costs (higher φ) discourage dispersion. Following Fujita et
al. (1999), we call φb the break point. Given the no black-hole condition in (21), we have
φb > 0, meaning that there always exists a freeness of trade below which dispersion is
stable (given the values of µ and σ). On the other hand, the fact that φb < 1 means that
there always exists a level of freeness of trade above which dispersion is unstable.
9If BP (φ) > 0, total dispersion is unstable. If BP (φ) = 0, total dispersion may be stable or unstable.
See Tabuchi et al. (2005), footnote 10.
10If agents have a very strong preference for variety (σ < 1 + µ), total dispersion is never stable.
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3.2 Stability of agglomeration
Agglomeration, (h1, h2, ..., hn) = (1, 0, ..., 0), is a corner solution on a vertex of the simplex.
Given the absence of entrepreneurs in all regions except one, the weighted average real
wage is simply ω̄ = ω1, that is, the weighted average real wage is the same as the real
wage in region 1.
By symmetry, the real wages in the empty regions are equal (ω2 = ... = ωn). That
ω1 > ω2 is sufficient for agglomeration to be stable follows from the fact that entrepreneurs
migrate to regions with higher real wages, together with continuity of real wages with
respect to the spatial distribution. If the indirect utility of entrepreneurs is strictly higher
in region 1 than in the all the other regions, there are no incentives for entrepreneurs in
region 1 to migrate. We can say that agglomeration in region 1 is a stable configuration
if:11




















σ−1 < 1, a sufficient condition for the stability of agglomeration is that the nominal
wage is higher in the core than in the periphery. From the expression for w1 and w2 in (15),
the next proposition is obtained by rearranging the expression SP (φ) ≡ w2φ
µ
σ−1 − w1.
Proposition 2. Agglomeration is a stable equilibrium if:12
SP (φ) ≡ σ − µ+ [σ + µ(n− 1)]φ2 + [σ(n− 2) + µ(2− n)]φ− nσφ1−
µ
σ−1 < 0. (23)
Since SP (φ) is a convex function and we have SP (0) > 0, SP (1) = 0 and SP ′(1) > 0, the
function SP (φ) has exactly one zero in φ ∈ (0, 1). This value, denoted φs, is the sustain
point, i.e., the threshold for φ above which agglomeration is a stable equilibrium. If the
“freeness of trade” parameter is high enough (i.e., if transport costs are low enough),
agglomeration is stable. This is because lower transport costs imply that price indices
become relatively higher in the regions that are deserted and thus real wages become
relatively lower.
11It is unstable if ω1 < w2.
12It is unstable if SP (φ) > 0.
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3.3 Stability of partial dispersion
We now address the stability of configurations in which entrepreneurs are equally dispersed
across m regions, with 1 < m < n, while the remaining n −m regions are empty. Such
configurations are always equilibria of the dynamical system (18). For simplicity, we









Proposition 3. If partial dispersion between two regions is stable, then γ ≥ 0 and Ψ ≤ 0,
where:











n− [2σ + µ(n− 2)] (1− φ)(2φ+ 1).
Ψ ≡ µ(σ + 3σφ− 2φ)n− µ2(1− φ)n− µ(1− φ)− 2σ(σ − 1− µ)(1− φ)
(24)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Partial dispersion appears to be unstable for all parameter values. However, because of
the non-linearity of γ(φ), we are not able to prove this analytically. Numerical inspection
of both conditions in (24) suggests that these are never simultaneously met, as illustrated
in Figure 1 for the case of three regions. This conclusion is not surprising, since partial
dispersion has also been numerically shown to be unstable in other models, such as the
3-region CP model by Castro et al. (2012) and by Fujita et al. (1999).
Figure 1 – Parameter regions in which γ ≥ 0 and Ψ ≤ 0 for n = 3. The two
regions do not seem to overlap, indicating that the two stability conditions are never
simultaneously satisfied.
The consideration of a greater number of regions seems to reinforce this conclusion.




> 0. However, it is ∂Ψ
∂n
> 0 that suggests the instability of partial dispersion.
This leads to the conjecture that partial dispersion between two regions is never stable
for any n.13
4 Impact of the number of regions
A reason to build an n-region model is to be able to understand the impact of the number
of regions on the behaviour of the FE model. Castro et al. (2012) proved that, in an
extension of Krugman’s CP model to three regions, more regions favour agglomeration as
a stable outcome. Here, we obtain a stronger result in the same direction.
Proposition 4. The parameter region for which agglomeration is stable in the FE model
with n+1 regions contains that of the FE model with n regions. Comparing agglomeration
between both models, we find that: (i) the ratio between price indices in the core and in
the periphery are the same; (ii) the ratio between nominal wages in the core and periphery
is higher in the model with n+ 1 regions.
Proof. See Appendix D.
In other words, an increase in the number of regions favours stability of agglomeration
in the FE model. We next detail the explanation for why this happens.
An entrepreneur who migrates to the periphery will find a cost-of-living that is inde-
pendent of the number of regions, but the size of the internal market is smaller compared
to the core if there are more regions because the fraction of unskilled workers that live
there is smaller. All the other entrepreneurs and the remaining unskilled workers would
constitute the external market. Given the existence of transportation costs to the other
regions, this entrepreneur will face a lower relative global demand in a model with more
regions, and, therefore, will earn a lower nominal wage. This leads to the fact that ag-
glomeration is more likely in a model with more regions. Recalling expression (23) from
Proposition 4, it can be shown that limn→+∞ SP (φ) < 0, which means that, in the limit,
when the number of regions tends to infinity, agglomeration is always stable.
We are also able to compare the stability conditions of total dispersion in the FE
model with n regions and the FE model with n+ 1 regions.
Proposition 5. The parameter region for which total dispersion is stable in the FE model
with n regions contains that of the FE model with n+ 1 regions.
13This result is confirmed analytically in the multi-region setting by Gaspar et al. (2017). However,
their work is based on quasi-linear upper tier utility instead of Cobb-Douglas and is therefore less related
to the original CP model than our framework.
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Proof. Observe that φb in (22) decreases as the number of regions increases. This means
that an increase in the number of regions makes total dispersion less likely to be stable.
We conclude that an increase in the number of regions hinders stability of total dis-
persion. After a small deviation from total dispersion, the market-size effect and the
market-crowding effect in the larger region becomes stronger (resp. weaker) as the num-
ber of regions increases, because each of the smaller regions individually faces a lower
local demand given less unskilled workers. Therefore, as the number of immobile workers
per region decreases, so diminishes its role as a dispersive force. From (20) in Proposition
2, it is possible to verify that limn→+∞BP (φ) > 0. Thus, in the limit, when the number
of regions tends to infinity, total dispersion is never stable. In this case, the amount of
immobile workers in each region becomes negligible.
Remark. Notice that stability of agglomeration or dispersion does not depend on the total
number of entrepreneurs and unskilled workers. Therefore, our conclusions are robust to
any possible dependence of the global size and composition of the workforce on the number
of regions.
In the equidistant multi-regional model by Gaspar et al. (2017), who use quasi-linear
utility as in Pflüger (2004), it is possible to show that more regions also favour full
agglomeration and discourage total dispersion, but only for a fixed global unskilled to
skilled labour ratio L/H, i.e., the impact of more regions depends on how the global
composition of workers changes with n.14
4.1 Numerical evidence of locational hysteresis
One feature of the 2-region CP and FE models is the existence of a subcritical pitchfork
bifurcation. This kind of bifurcation implies that there are values of the freeness-of-trade
parameter, φ ∈ (φs, φb), for which total dispersion and agglomeration are simultaneously
stable. Therefore, the long-run distribution of economic activity depends on the initial
distribution of economic activity. The model exhibits locational hysteresis.
Recall from (20) and (23) that BP and SP are functions of (φ, σ, µ, n). We establish
analytically the existence of an open subset in parameter space (φ, σ, µ, n) in which both
total dispersion and agglomeration are stable outcomes. Consider the point in parameter
space (φ, σ, µ, n) = (0.4, 3, 0.4, 3). At this point, we have both BP < 0 and SP < 0.
Therefore, both total dispersion and agglomeration are stable equilibria. Since BP and
SP are continuous functions of (φ, σ, µ, n), they remain negative in an open neighbourhood
of (0.4, 3, 0.4, 3).
14It would be interesting to further investigate this result in a different setting, like an extension of
Ottaviano et al. (2002) to incorporate equidistant multiple regions.
14
Simulating the expressions for BP and SP in (20) and (23) for a grid of values of µ
and/or σ, we always obtain an interval for φ where we have simultaneity of agglomeration
and dispersion. Our results are displayed in Figure 2. The picture to the left depicts
Figure 2 – To the left we have {(φ, σµ, n) : BP = 0}∪{(φ, σµ, n) : SP = 0} for σ = 3.
To the right, we have {(φ, σµ, n) : BP < 0} ∪ {(φ, σµ, n) : SP < 0} for σ = 3 and
µ = 0.3.
the surfaces corresponding to BP (φ, 3, µ, n) = 0 and SP (φ, 3, µ, n) = 0 in (φ, µ, n)
space.15 Between the surfaces we have {(φ, σµ, n) : BP < 0} ∩ {(φ, σµ, n) : SP < 0}, so
agglomeration and dispersion are both stable. Although this region in (φ, n, µ) space
appears to be very thin, it suggests that, for any triple (σ, n, µ), there always exists
values of φ for which agglomeration and dispersion are simultaneously stable. Thus φs <
φb and there is locational hysteresis.16 To the right, we fix µ and portray the planes
{(φ, n) : BP (φ, 3, 0.3, n) < 0} ∪ {(φ, n) : SP < 0(φ, 3, 0.3, n)}. The region between the
dashed lines corresponds to {(φ, n) : BP (φ, 3, 0.3, n) < 0}∩{(φ, n) : SP < 0(φ, 3, 0.3, n)},
which implies simultaneity of agglomeration and total dispersion. This picture shows
strong evidence that this simultaneity always exists whatever the number of regions.
Moreover, the scope for simultaneity, measured by the difference φb − φs, seems to be
increasing in n. In other words, more regions imply a greater range of values of the
freeness of trade φ for which agglomeration and dispersion are simultaneously stable.
Our evidence suggests that, for any given values of n, µ and σ, there always exists
value of φ for which total dispersion and agglomeration simultaneously stable, i.e., we
15The choice to fix σ was due to the fact that our simulations evidenced invariance of the results in the
choice of values for this parameter.
16It is worth stressing the fact that our evidence suggests invariance of our results to changes in σ.
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always have φs < φb. This means that the n-region FE model also exhibits locational
hysteresis. In this sense, temporary decreases in transport costs below the sustain point
may trigger agglomeration in one region permanently.
5 Agglomeration under asymmetric regions
In this section we let the regions differ in terms of their endowments of farmers. As a result,
we are introducing exogenous regional differences such that now each Li may be different
from Lj, i 6= j. Without loss of generality, assume that all industry is concentrated in













Nominal wages are determined by (12) and by the adapted version of (13), Yi = Li +
wiHi, ∀i. Agglomeration is stable if ω1 > maxi 6=1 {ωi}. Since regional prices remain












Assume also w.l.o.g. that region 2 is the region among the n− 1 peripheral regions that






This leads to the following result.




σφ2L1 + L2 [σ − µ (1− φ2)]+ φ
n∑
j=3
Lj [σ − µ(1− φ)]
− σφL(n) < 0, (25)
and L1 ≥ L2. In this case, agglomeration in region 1 is stable if the freeness of trade is high
enough.
Proof. See Appendix E.
If L1 ≥ L2, there exists a sustain point φs ≡ φ ∈ (0, 1) above which agglomeration
in region 1 is stable. However, if L1 < L2 it is possible that agglomeration in region 1
is never stable even as trade barriers approach zero. Such an outcome would require the
number of farmers in region 1 relative to region 2 to be very low.
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By looking at nominal wages, we explain in detail how the distribution of farmers
across different regions impacts the likelihood of agglomeration. First, from Appendix E,






j=3 Lj + L2
)
H(n)(µ− σ) . (26)
The entrepeneur’s nominal and real wage at the core is the same as in the case of symmetric
regions. In the numerator, we rewrote L(n) as the sum of the farmers in region 1 with
the farmers in region 2 and the farmers living in all the other regions. An increase in the
number of farmers in any of the regions impacts the core’s nominal wage with the same





2 + L2 [σ − µ(1− φ)2] +
∑n
j=3 Ljφ [σ − µ(1− φ)]
}
H(n)σφ(σ − µ) (27)
Remark. Since σ − µ (1− φ2) > φ [σ − µ(1− φ)], it follows that w2 = maxi 6=1 {wi} if
and only if L2 ≥ Li, ∀i 6= 1. Therefore, the periphery with the highest nominal wage
corresponds to the periphery that has the highest number of farmers.
From inspection of (27), an increase in the number of farmers in any region also
increases w2. However, the marginal impact of L2 on w2 is higher than that of each







j=3 Lj + L2
)
σφ
L2 [σ − µ (1− φ2)] +
∑n
j=3 Ljφ [σ − µ(1− φ) + σ] + L1σφ2
.
The wage ratio is increasing in L1, but decreasing in L2 and any Lj 6=1,2. This means
that agglomeration is more (less) likely if L1 (resp. L2, Lj 6=1,2) increases. Moreover, the
negative impact of L2 on is higher than that of Lj 6=1,2. The economic intuition does not
stray from that given in Section 4. In fact, the present case encompasses the symmetric
one, as an increase in L1 or a decrease in L2 decreases the relative nominal (and real)
wage in region 2. Analogous reasoning in the symmetric case would be to consider an
increase in the number of regions and resulting decrease in a periphery’s Li = L/n. Both
cases lead to a strengthening of the agglomerative outcome.
6 Conclusion
Building on the 2-region FE model by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), we have obtained
both analytical and numerical results from a FE model with an arbitrary number of
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equidistant regions. We have shown that an increase in the number of regions, other things
being equal, favours stability of agglomeration and hinders stability of total dispersion.
This happens because the amount of immobile unskilled workforce per region decreases
which in turn diminishes its role as a dispersive force. In the limit, when the number of
regions tends to infinity, agglomeration becomes the unique stable equilibrium.
Upon introducing exogenous asymmetries in the regional distribution of unskilled la-
bour, we have concluded that market size effects operate through the nominal (hence real)
wages in a way such that an increase in unskilled labour in the core region strengthens the
stability of agglomeration. The same happens if unskilled labour in the peripheral regions
is decreased. This is what actually happens in the symmetric case when the number of
regions increases.
We have also provided numerical evidence that strongly suggests that dispersion of
entrepreneurs between two regions is never stable in a model with more than two regions,
where it corresponds to an outcome of partial dispersion.
Finally, we have found numerical evidence in that, for every triple (µ, σ, n), there
exists φ ∈ (0, 1) where agglomeration and total dispersion can be simultaneously stable,
though this outcome is relatively unlikely. This means that, like the 2-region model, the
FE model with more regions exhibits a core-periphery pattern based on a “subcritical
pitchfork” bifurcation. The scope for multiplicity of equilibria seems to be higher for a
higher number of regions.
These results are in the same direction as those obtained by Castro et al. (2012) for
the CP model with three regions. Through the more tractable framework of the FE model
we were able to obtain explicit solutions for the wages of entrepreneurs and show that
most key features of Krugman’s seminal CP model are likely to hold in a multi-regional
set-up.
Further developments of our analysis could benefit from the interplay between the
number of regions and other key variables. For instance, letting the number of regions
and transportation costs co-vary could help us compare agglomeration patterns across
different jurisdiction levels (e.g., country, province, county, city). Additionally, the impact
of the number of regions could depend on (or influence) the relative location of regions in
space. This means studies which have focused on the role of space heterogeneity under a
limited number of regions (e.g., Barbero and Zofío, 2016) may be complementary to our
own.
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Appendix A - Nominal wage in the 3-region model













































































































where the denominator D stands for the determinant of matrix A and Dwi is the determ-
inant of the matrix obtained by replacing the i-th column of A by the column vector B.
We have:



























































































































































































Appendix B - Jacobian and total dispersion
As a prerequisite to Proposition 1, establishing the stability of total dispersion, we have
the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Concerning total dispersion: (i) The Jacobian matrix of the (n−1)-dimensional













Proof. In this proof, we display all n region coordinates of the real wage function rather
than omit the last coordinate, as this clarifies the way variations in the first n − 1 co-
ordinates are reflected in hn =
∑n−1
i=1 hi. Changes in hi are symmetrically reflected in hn,
i.e., for any i 6= n, a small variation ∆hi = ε implies that ∆hn = −ε. An element of the







We will first show that ∂hiω̄ = 0, ∀i at total dispersion, i.e., Jii = ∂ωi∂hi .






















+ ε). However, the fact that regions are completely
symmetric in all respects asserts that ω̄ is invariant in the permutation of any hi and
















and we arrive at a contradiction. As a result, it must be that ∂h1ω̄ = 0 and therefore J11 =
∂h1ω1.Moreover, symmetry between regions implies that ∂h1ω1 = ∂h2ω2 = . . . = ∂hn−1ωn−1
at total dispersion. This leads to the conclusion that J11 = J22 = . . . = Jn−1,n−1, implying
that all diagonal elements of the Jacobian are given by Jii = ∂hiωi.
We will next show that all elements outside the main diagonal are zero at total dis-






We have seen that ∂hiω̄ = 0 at total dispersion. A similar argument to the one used
to prove that ∂hiω̄ = 0 shows that ∂hjωi = 0 at total dispersion. Thus, all off-diagonal
elements are zero and the (n− 1)× (n− 1) Jacobian matrix at total dispersion is a scalar













Proof of Proposition 1
We compute ∂w1/∂h1 at total dispersion while avoiding having to solve a system of n− 1
linear equations using just two wage equations from (15), e.g., for w1 and wn. The reason
is that, after Lemma 1, there are n− 2 wages equal to wj for which ∂wj/∂h1 = 0. As a





















































































, rj = 1n +
(n−1)φ
n




the second equation for wn and replacing it in the first one, knowing that ∂wj/∂h1 = 0











= µL(n)n(φ− 1) [µ+ µ(n− 1)φ− σ(1− φ)]
H(n)(µ− σ) [(n− 1)φ+ 1] [−µ(1− φ) + (n− 1)σφ+ σ] .
By (14), we have:
∂P µ1 /∂h1
P µ1
= µn(φ− 1)(σ − 1) [(n− 1)φ+ 1] .










µ2(φ− 1) + µ(2σ − 1) [(n− 1)φ+ 1] + (σ − 1)σ(φ− 1)
}
H(n)(σ − 1)(µ− σ) [(n− 1)φ+ 1] [µ+ (n− 1)σφ+ σ − µ] .
Note that the denominator is negative as is the factor (φ − 1) in the numerator. Hence,
total dispersion is stable if:
BP (φ) ≡ µ(2σ − 1) [(n− 1)φ+ 1]− µ2(1− φ)− (σ − 1)σ(1− φ) < 0,
which concludes the proof. 
Appendix C - Jacobian and partial dispersion
The next result is used in the study of partial dispersion (also holds for total dispersion).
Lemma 2. Configurations h = (h1, h2, ..., hn) such that h1 = hn = a ∈ (0, 1) and h2 =





Proof. Suppose that ∂ω̄
∂h1
(a, b, ..., b, a) > 0. Then:
ω̄(a+ ε, b, ..., b, a− ε) > ω̄(a, b, ..., b, a).
But, ω̄ is invariant by the permutation that interchanges identically populated regions
and therefore:
ω̄(a− ε, b, ..., b, a+ ε) > ω̄(a, b, ..., b, a)
indicating that ∂ω̄
∂h1
< 0, which contradicts the assumption. Therefore, we have ∂ω̄
∂h1
= 0,
which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
(i). First, since hj = 0 for j = {2, ..., n− 1}, we have the following condition for stability
of partial dispersion:
ω1 > ωj.
Second, we need to ensure not only that hj will remain zero but also that both h1 and hn
will remain at 12 . If any of the skilled workers migrates from region 1 to region n, we need
them to want to return to region 1 (symmetry implies the same in the opposite direction).
This is achieved when an increase in h1 leads to a decrease in the difference between the






























Notice that both conditions are sufficient for stability, but need not be necessary. If
one of the conditions (or both) holds in equality, partial dispersion may also be stable.
Therefore, what we can say is that if partial dispersion is stable, then:
ωi (hp) ≥ ωj (hp) and
∂ωi
∂hi









(ii). We now proceed to compute ωi (hp) and and
∂ωi
∂hi
(hp). First, we determine the
nominal wages in regions 1 and n at partial dispersion. For regions 1 and n we use
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equation (15) to get:
w1 (hp) = wn (hp) =
µL(n)
H(n)(σ − µ) .







σ−µ + φ+ 1
)
− 2(1− φ)(2φ+ 1)
]
H(n)nσφ(φ+ 1) .










µ(n− 2)(φ− 1)(2φ+ 1) + σ
[













Rewriting it, we obtain:
γ ≡ σ(1 + φ)
1− φ1− µσ−1 (1 + φ2
) µ
σ−1
n− [2σ + µ(n− 2)] (1− φ)(2φ+ 1) < 0.
In order to determine the second condition, we follow an approach analogous to that of
the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B, selecting two wage equations from (15) and




















h1 + φ(1− h1)
+ n− 2 + φ




















h1 + φ(1− h1)
+ n− 2 + 1
φh1 + 1− h1
)
Solving the second equation for wn and replacing in the first we obtain w1 as a function
of h1. Then, differentiating with respect to h1 and evaluating at h1 = 1/2, we get:
∂w1
∂h1
(hp) = 4µL(n)(φ− 1) [µ+ µ(n− 1)φ+ σ(φ− 1)]
H(n)n(φ+ 1)(µ− σ) [φ(µ+ σ)− µ+ σ] .
Differentiating the price index, by (14):
∂P µ1 /∂h1
P µ1
(hp) = 2µ(φ− 1)(σ − 1)(φ+ 1) .














which is negative if and only if:
Ψ ≡ µ2n(φ− 1) + µ [σ(3nφ+ n− 2φ+ 2)− 2nφ+ 2φ− 2] + 2(σ − 1)σ(φ− 1) < 0,
which gives us the second condition, concluding the proof. 
Appendix D - Comparing models
Proof of Proposition 4
The derivative of SP in (23) with respect to n is negative. This implies that an increase
in the number of regions decreases φs, for any given values of the remaining parameters.
This shows that agglomeration is more likely in a FE model with more regions.








which does not depend on the number of regions and proves part (i) of the proposition.
The nominal wage in the core region i is given by:
wi =
µL(n)
(σ − µ)H(n) .
The peripheral nominal wage is equal to:
wj =
µL(n) {µ(φ− 1) [(n− 1)φ+ 1] + σφ(n+ φ− 2) + σ}
H(n)nσφ(σ − µ)




µ(φ− 1) [(n− 1)φ+ 1] + σφ(n+ φ− 2) + σ ,





{µ(φ− 1) [(n− 1)φ+ 1] + σφ(n+ φ− 2) + σ2} > 0,
thus concluding the final part of the proof.
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Appendix E - Stability of agglomeration under asymmetries
Proof of Proposition 6









2 + L2 [σ − µ (1− φ2)] +
∑n
j=3 Ljφ [σ − µ(1− φ)]
}
H(n)σφ(σ − µ) .











j=3 Lj [σ − µ(1− φ)] + Lm [σ − µ (1− φ2)]
}
H(n)σφ(µ− σ) < 0,












)]− σφL(n) < 0.




j=3 Lj + L2
)
.
Note that Γ′′(φ) > 0, so Γ(φ) is convex. Moreover, Γ(0) = L2(σ − µ) > 0, Γ(1) = 0, and
Γ′(1) = µL(n)
σ − 1 + µ(L1 + 3L2 + 2
n∑
j=3
Lj) + σ(L1 − L2).
If L1 ≥ L2 then Γ′(1) > 0 and there exists a single sustain point φs ≡ φ ∈ (0, 1) above
which agglomeration in region 1 is stable. This concludes the proof. 
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